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Maria Domańska
On 6 December Vladimir Putin announced that he will run in the presidential election to be 
held on 18 March 2018. The absence of any change in the office of Russia’s president is root-
ed in the logic of a personalised system of governance that has emerged in Russia. It is also 
a demonstration of the government’s will to maintain the present course in domestic and 
foreign policy, one that is static and devoid of any scope for development. This is regardless 
of the fact that the government is struggling with increasingly serious economic and socio- 
-political challenges. These mainly include economic stagnation, continuously decreasing real 
incomes, and tense relations with the West, all combined with the lack of a coherent, positive 
ideology to legitimise Putin’s model. Against this backdrop, the election-related actions the 
government has taken to date are of a provisional and tactical nature: they focus on efforts to 
achieve a stabilisation of the socio-political situation and to eliminate possible threats to the 
ruling elite in the pre- and post-election period. At the same time, attempts are being made 
to make the electoral ritual more attractive, so as to boost turnout and thereby demonstrate 
a high approval rating for both the president and the model of governance he endorses.
Putin for the fourth time – an intrigue 
without an intrigue
Over the last couple of months, an artificially 
created tension had been mounting around the 
question of Putin seeking re-election. It was 
accompanied by short-lived gossip suggesting 
that the Kremlin may authorise another candi-
date (for example, Prime Minister Dmitri Medve-
dev) to run in the election. However, the logic of 
the system, Putin’s position within this system, 
and his personal interests all clearly indicated 
that his participation in the election was a sure 
thing from the start1. The President had long 
1 For Putin, the constitution seems to be the only limita-
tion. However, the present constitutional laws allow him 
to hold the office of president for another term. Accord-
ing to the basic law, one person must not hold the office 
of president for more than two consecutive terms (this 
means that after the presidency of Dmitri Medvedev in 
2008–2012, the years 2018–2024 will be Putin’s second 
consecutive term in office).
been reluctant to announce his participation in 
the election (the exact date of the election was 
announced on 15 December, which also marks 
the official launch of the election campaign). 
Making this situation appear like some palace 
intrigue probably served the purpose of artifi-
cially boosting the attractiveness of the election 
process, stoking a feeling of uncertainty in or-
der to ‘discipline’ the elite and evoking concerns 
among a segment of society that the domestic 
situation may become destabilised should Putin 
leave office next year. 
The candidacy was announced sooner than 
expected – not during the annual presidential 
press conference on 14 December but during 
Putin’s visit to Nizhny Novgorod. It seems that 
the long-awaited decision was brought forward 
to divert public attention from the giant blot 
on Russia’s image suffered in connection with 
the decision by the Executive Board of the In-
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ternational Olympic Committee of 5 December 
2017. The Russian Federation was banned from 
participation in the Winter Olympics in Pyong-
chang in 2018. The Board authorised Russian 
athletes to compete in the games under the 
Olympic flag only2. The choice of audience for 
Putin’s announcement – workers employed in 
the GAZ automotive plant, who pleaded with 
Putin to confirm his candidacy (the entire situa-
tion looked like a stage-managed performance) 
– seems to indicate that the president is posi-
tioning himself as a representative of the ‘com-
mon folk’ and wishes to appeal to traditional-
ly-minded voters3.
There are several reasons behind the fact that 
Putin is running for re-election. Firstly, his deci-
sion stems from the logic of a personalised sys-
tem of governance that has emerged in Russia. 
It is evident that the Kremlin strives to maintain 
its present course in domestic and foreign poli-
tics, one that is inert and lacking any prospects 
for development yet still enables the ruling elite 
to expand their private wealth. In this situation, 
Putin, who over the last decade or so has been 
positioned as an unrivalled leader having a rel-
atively high approval rating, is the only candi-
date capable of legitimising a system that is 
confronting increasingly serious socio-political 
2 The decision came as a result of the doping scandal 
surrounding the Olympic Games in Sochi: it has been 
proved that representatives of the Russian government 
were at that time involved in a systemic violation of an-
ti-doping procedures (as a consequence a number of 
Russian athletes have been stripped of their Olympic 
medals and only those athletes who have been cleared 
off doping charges will be allowed to compete in the 
Olympic Games in South Korea).
3 A few hours earlier, at a meeting with young people, 
Putin only enigmatically announced that he would make 
the decision shortly.
challenges (more on this later on). Secondly, 
in the eyes of the elite he continues to hold 
the status of the sole arbiter able to guarantee 
a relative balance between various influence 
groups. Thirdly, his own interests and philos-
ophy of governance should be taken into ac-
count. At present, mutual distrust common 
among the Russian ruling elite, combined with 
the fact that Putin needs a safety guarantee 
for the wealth he has amassed and a person-
al security guarantee for himself, rule out the 
option of him passing the helm of the state 
to a successor. 
The official nomination of the Kremlin’s can-
didate in the upcoming presidential election 
is important not so much in the context of 
the artificially stoked ‘intrigues’ now being re-
solved, but in the context of two other issues. 
The first one is the fundamental importance of 
this election for the Russian political system, 
including the potential change to the state’s 
most prominent office. The other issue is the 
actual stance the state authorities take on ma-
jor challenges that serve as the backdrop for 
the upcoming election. 
The role of the presidential election 
Due to the president’s central position in the 
system, the presidential election is of par-
amount importance for the stability of the 
Russian model of governance. The president’s 
position results from his broad competences 
defined in the constitution. However, Vladimir 
Putin’s personal characteristics are also of ma-
jor importance4. Since 2000, he has managed 
to solidify his image as an arbiter overseeing 
the appropriate balance between various inter-
est groups in the elite, and – especially since the 
annexation of Crimea in 2014 – as the leader of 
4 This was evident during Dmitri Medvedev’s presidency: 
back then Putin managed to maintain the position of 
the actual decision maker and Medvedev was forced to 
pass the office of the head of state to him in the subse-
quent term.
Paradoxically, the key role that the presi-
dential election plays in the Russian sys-
tem is not compromised by the fact that 
it is a sham election.
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the nation legitimising the authoritarian model 
in the eyes of society, due to his charisma and 
aggressive foreign policy. 
Paradoxically, the key role of the presidential 
election in the system is not compromised by 
the fact that, as with all other elections held 
in Russia, it is in actuality a sham election. Its 
course and result are not so much a demon-
stration of the voters’ will but rather the result 
of decisions made by the ruling group and the 
mobilisation of an administrative apparatus. 
The latter operates in a situation where the op-
position is marginalised, the Kremlin fully dom-
inates the media, and civil freedoms (such as 
freedom of speech and freedom of assembly) 
are regularly being violated. Due to the fact 
that society has been stripped of its political 
subjectivity, the electoral campaign and the 
voting process itself resemble a plebiscite and 
are conducted within a unique political vacuum 
(with no real, fair competition between the can-
didates and no conflicting interests among spe-
cific social groups). Nonetheless, on each such 
occasion the authorities strive to conceal this 
vacuum with pseudo-democratic procedures. 
It is their priority to legitimise the electoral illu-
sion (at both a domestic and international lev-
el) and at the same time create the impression 
that there is no alternative to the candidate 
backed by the Kremlin – no-one can threaten 
his political position, no-one can govern the 
country better than he does, and no-one else 
can guarantee peace and stability. Control of 
the electoral process, of the course of the cam-
paign and of the surrounding social mood en-
sures the security and wealth of the ruling elite. 
The fact that power has been focused around 
the president results in a situation in which 
problems with efficient organisation of the elec-
toral campaign, and with achieving the desired 
result, may destabilise the system as a whole, 
including the balance of influence among the 
elite and the image of the government as seen 
by society.
In these circumstances, the presidential election 
in Russia has two main roles to play. Firstly, it is 
a unique test of the effectiveness and loyalty of 
the ruling elite and the bureaucratic apparatus. 
Mobilising the entire state apparatus to achieve 
the desired electoral result makes it possible 
to ascertain its effectiveness and discern the 
weakest links and dysfunctions. These may in-
volve the inability to avoid electoral scandals 
(for instance, a vote-rigging exercise that is too 
blatant) which undermine the legitimacy of the 
process as a whole. The lack of consolidation 
and the presence of conflicts within the elites 
at regional and local levels may not only com-
promise the efficiency of the efforts focused on 
the election result but also tarnish the image of 
state authorities, and thereby, the image of the 
candidate backed by them – especially if this is 
accompanied by unauthorised criticism of the 
Kremlin’s domestic and foreign policy, offered 
by representatives of the state apparatus. The 
government’s inability to guarantee social sta-
bility in the pre- and post-election period or to 
neutralise the mood of dissatisfaction and pro-
test may also pose a major threat.
Secondly, the election provides a veneer of dia- 
logue between the government and society, 
intended to legitimise the authoritarian mod-
el of governance. Electoral promises made by 
the government-backed candidate serve the 
purpose of pretending that the state cares for 
its citizens and that society and the ruling elite 
have common interests. Moreover, the election 
is an opportunity to fathom the true feelings 
of the general public in a system in which the 
standard channels of communication between 
society and government are largely limited. 
Firstly, the election is a unique test of the 
effectiveness and loyalty of the ruling elite 
and the bureaucratic apparatus. Secondly, 
it gives the outward appearance of a dia-
logue between government and society.
4OSW COMMENTARY   NUMBER 256
The electoral campaign enables a controlled 
emergence of ‘constructive’ (non-political) 
grassroots social demands. Some of them may 
later be included in a set of electoral promis-
es which the Kremlin-backed candidate makes. 
To counter the anti-system, uncontrolled criti-
cism, two types of measures are being deployed: 
the authors of such criticism are repressed and 
some of the demands voiced by the real oppo-
sition are co-opted by the Kremlin’s candidate 
or by the ‘intra-system’ opposition approved by 
the Kremlin, which makes it possible to dilute 
the potential for protest5. 
The context of the presidential election
The present stage of development of Putin’s 
model of governance is characterised by stag-
nation and inertia in the economic, political 
and ideological spheres (it is frequently com-
pared with the Brezhnev era of ‘blossoming de-
cay’). Efforts to mobilise public support for the 
government focus on negative issues: strength-
ening the anti-Western ideology6, with its un-
derlying concepts of seeking an enemy and of 
Russia being a fortress under siege, re-Soviet-
isation of the policy of memory and consent-
ing to a rehabilitation of profoundly autocratic 
models of governance7.
5 In this way a rift in opposition groups is being created 
alongside a division of these groups into groups enjoy-
ing different levels of ‘privileged treatment’ from the 
government, and a portion of the opposition (the coun-
ter-elites) is being included in the state establishment.
6 For more on the regime’s legitimisation resulting from 
anti-Western foreign policy see M. Domańska, ‘Con-
flict-dependent Russia. The domestic determinants of 
the Kremlin’s anti-Western policy’, OSW Point of View, 
6 November 2017, https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/pub-
likacje/point-view/2017-11-06/conflict-dependent-rus-
sia-domestic-determinants-kremlins-anti
7 K. Chawryło, ‘Stalin in contemporary Russia: admired 
and required’, OSW Commentary, 31 October 2017, 
https: //www.osw.waw.pl /en/publikacje /osw-com-
mentary/2017-10-31/stalin-contemporary-russia-ad-
mired-and-required; M. Domańska, ‘Russia marks the 
70th anniversary of the victory over Nazism: What signif-
icance does it have in an epoch of global confrontation?’, 
OSW Commentary, 20 May 2015, https://www.osw.waw.
pl/en/publikacje/osw-commentary/2015-05-20/rus-
sia-marks-70th-anniversary-victory-over-nazism-what
For the Kremlin, the key challenge in the pre- 
and post-election period is the rising problem 
concerning legitimisation of the authoritari-
an model of governance. The main source of 
this problem is the prospect that the current 
economic stagnation, which is adversely af-
fecting the financial situation of Russian cit-
izens8, may continue in the upcoming years. 
At the same time, the strong impetus that arose 
from the nation-wide euphoria following Rus-
sia’s annexation of Crimea has been exhausted. 
Furthermore, the cost of the geopolitical con-
frontation with the West is becoming increas-
ingly evident, both for society and for busi-
nesspeople and members of the political elite9. 
So far, the government has not announced any 
comprehensive economic reform programme 
and it should be assumed that even if such 
a programme was announced, it would remain 
mere empty platitudes due to the dysfunction-
al model of economic governance and its ex-
treme politicisation10, as well as the fear of po-
litical consequences arising from the reforms. 
8 Between November 2014 and the autumn of 2017 
real incomes declined by almost 20%. https://lenta.ru/
news/2017/10/18/padenie_dohodov/
9 The Russian political and business elite seems to be 
alarmed by both the announced tightening of the US 
sanctions against Russia and the detention in November 
2017 in France of Russian oligarch Suleiman Kerimov (on 
money laundering and tax evasion charges).
10 For details see M. Domańska, ‘Crisis in Russia. The deg-
radation of the model of economic governance’, OSW 
Studies, 3 March 2017, https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/
publikacje/osw-studies/2017-03-03/crisis-russia-deg-
radation-model-economic-governance. The diagno-
sis is not changed by the fact that the government is 
regularly expressing its readiness to carry out vaguely 
defined reforms – Alexei Kudrin remains the symbol of 
these reforms, on request from the Kremlin he prepared 
a reform programme whose comprehensive implemen-
tation is rather unlikely.
The present stage of the development of 
Putin’s model of governance resembles the 
Brezhnev era of ’blossoming decay’.
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The government limits itself to solving isolated 
problems and addressing the most burning is-
sues immediately prior to the election, including 
by offering one-time cash injections. This indi-
cates that the government’s attitude is focused 
not so much on devising a strategy to combat 
challenges as on maintaining the ‘provisional 
political management’ by tactical handling of 
selected realms in which the state operates. 
It seems that the Kremlin is seriously concerned 
by rising social dissatisfaction11, in particular 
the successful mobilisation of the potential 
for protest by the oppositionist figure, Alexei 
Navalny, mainly centred around the slogan of 
combating corruption, which is endemic in 
Russia and has spread to the highest levels of 
government. So far, neither the size nor the 
dynamic of the protests organised by Navalny 
pose an immediate threat to the government. 
This is due to Navalny’s highly negative approv-
al rating, the repressive measures taken against 
his supporters and Russian society’s enduring 
atomisation. However, the elite is becoming in-
creasingly aware that there are no adequate in-
struments to recognise the genuine, hidden po-
tential for protest and the true approval rating 
of the government and of the president (polls 
are not a reliable tool for measuring this due to 
the high level of respondents’ distrust of them). 
Local elections held in Moscow in September 
2017 were an alarm signal for the Kremlin – 
11 Experts point to an increase in the protest activity in 2017 
compared with 2016 (mainly regarding social issues) and 
although its scale remains insignificant, it is evident that 




the government’s efforts to lower the turnout 
as much as possible did not prevent the demo-
cratic opposition from achieving a good result 
(by Russian standards)12. 
The government’s strategy ahead 
of the election
The government’s inability to cope with the 
main socio-economic challenges, and – in the 
long run – with political challenges, combined 
with the need to demonstrate the regime’s 
stability determines the logic of its actions in 
the period ahead of the election. These actions 
have no overriding direction, they are more 
a provisional blend of repressive, as well as 
pseudo-liberalising and pro-social measures. 
The former ones are intended to eliminate 
or minimise the threat posed by opposition 
groups, the latter ones – to improve the gov-
ernment’s image and shore up its legitimacy. 
In this context, the frequently emphasised ded-
ication to fairness and transparency in the up-
coming election is significant. The prime con-
cern is maintaing domestic political stability in 
the pre- and post-election period – all the more 
so because the previous victory by Putin was 
accompanied by mass protests13. 
The selection of candidates, which is de facto 
made by the Kremlin, is of key importance for 
the course and the outcome of the election. 
Alexei Navalny, who has been successfully 
mobilising the potential for protest since the 
spring of 201714, has been eliminated from the 
12 For more see M. Domańska, The Kremlin’s regional pol-
icy – a year of dismissing governors, OSW Commentary, 
15 December 2017, https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/pub-
likacje/osw-commentary/2017-12-15/kremlins-region-
al-policy-a-year-dismissing-governors 
13 The protests in late 2011 and early 2012 were triggered 
both by the rigged parliamentary elections and by 
Putin’s decision to run in another presidential election 
following Medvedev’s ‘technical’ term. 
14 It has been repeatedly announced that he is not allowed 
to run in the election due to his two suspended sen-
tences. This interpretation was formulated on the basis 
of specific laws, whereas according to the constitution 
a suspended sentence does not strip one from their pas-
sive electoral right. 
For the Kremlin, the key challenge is 
the mounting problem concerning the 
legitimacy of the authoritarian model 
of governance.
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electoral race. He was the only candidate capa-
ble of being a genuine competitor (albeit not 
a threat) to Putin. Navalny’s collaborators are 
regularly detained, his active supporters are 
being intimidated; attempts are being made 
to paralyse the activity of his campaign offic-
es in Moscow and other regions. In contrast, 
the candidacy of Ksenia Sobchak, a well-known 
celebrity and journalist, who criticises both the 
Russian model of governance and Putin him-
self, serves the purpose of winning a portion 
of those voters who support the opposition. 
Most expert groups maintain that this candida-
cy is a Kremlin-backed project15. Unlike Navalny, 
Sobchak has no power and supporter base of 
her own; similarly, she has no real chance of 
achieving a meaningful result in the election. 
Nonetheless, the slogans she promotes may 
gain her a share of voters who are critical of 
the regime. Thereby, Sobchak is legitimising 
the Kremlin-manufactured illusion of an elec-
tion in which political ‘competitors’ can partici-
pate, while Navalny is calling on his supporters 
to boycott the election should he be prevent-
ed from running in it16. Another candidate, 
Boris Titov, the ombudsman for entrepreneurs’ 
rights and leader of the Party of Growth, loyal 
to the Kremlin, is intended to play a role similar 
to Sobchak’s and to legitimise the election, in 
this case in the eyes of liberal business circles.
Moreover, the group of candidates running in 
the election will traditionally include the veter-
15 The nature of Sobchak’s candidacy will be ultimately re-
vealed during subsequent stages of her campaign: with-
out support from state administration bodies it is virtually 
impossible to collect the required number of signatures 
due to short deadlines defined in the regulations.
16 Navalny is still waging his campaign to demand partici-
pation in the election.
ans of the Russian government-approved oppo-
sition, whose significance has been increasingly 
diminished: Gennadi Zyuganov, Vladimir Zhiri-
novski and Sergei Mironov.
Another element of the plan to legitimise the 
election involves attempts to make it appear 
more transparent. The President’s adminis-
tration has formulated guidelines for regional 
governments and electoral committees, includ-
ing clear instructions on how to avoid election 
rigging and other scandals that could trigger 
post-election protests. The head of the Central 
Electoral Committee has voiced similar appeals 
to the administration, in which she announced 
for example that the number of cameras in poll-
ing stations will be significantly increased and 
open access to information about the election 
will be guaranteed. All this serves the purpose 
of not so much organising a fair election as of 
responding to a certain propaganda demand 
for creating an illusion that the law is being 
abided by17. In this context, a particularly im-
portant challenge is faced by regional govern-
ments: they will have to maintain a balance 
between guaranteeing the desired election re-
sult and turnout (for which they will be held 
accountable after the election) and performing 
these actions ‘in velvet gloves’, without resort-
ing to flagrant vote-rigging (threatened by dis-
ciplinary or penal sanctions)18.
The Kremlin’s organisational moves are ac-
companied by an attempt to formulate the 
electoral programme. Although Putin’s official 
programme will likely be announced at the be-
ginning of 2018, two main lines of propagan-
da are already evident: dialogue with young 
people (most probably as a reaction to Alexei 
17 For example, there is a risk that most independent ob-
servers will be replaced with observers appointed by the 
Civic Chamber, an advisory body supervised by the exec-
utive power. 
18 It seems that the desired turnout is at least 60% (in 
Russia’s presidential elections the turnout has never 
been lower), although the most ambitious goal is 70%. 
As regards the proportion of votes cast for Putin, the opti-
mum figure is around 65–70%. According to a poll by the 
Levada Center conducted in November 2017, 58% of the 
respondents expressed their will to attend the election. 
The fact that Putin is seeking re-election 
means that the Kremlin intends to continue 
its current repressive and isolationist 
policy.
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Navalny’s mobilisation of secondary school pu-
pils and students)19 and pro-demographic initi-
atives intended to improve the situation of fam-
ilies, targeting the least affluent social groups 
whose members are the president’s traditional 
electorate20. Positive actions also include person-
nel changes made in 2017 – especially among 
regional governors, which are intended to tem-
porarily alleviate the tensions present in some of 
the regions and improve the government’s im-
age in advance of the election. Putin also made 
a token gesture to liberal groups and human 
rights defenders, when he ordered his adminis-
tration to ‘analyse’ (which de facto does not mean 
anything) the recommendations by the presiden-
tial Council for Human Rights regarding the cases 
of violation of human rights and civil freedoms 
in Russia.
However, the government’s true intentions can 
be seen in the initiatives carried out against the 
19 Since May 2017, Putin has regularly attended various 
meetings dedicated to the problems faced by children and 
youth. https://www.rbc.ru/politics/06/12/2017/5a280ed-
c9a794720889f81a7?from=newsfeed
20 K. Chawryło, Putin’s pro-family support programme, OSW 
Analyses, 6 December 2017, https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/
publikacje/analyses/2017-12-06/putins-pro-family-sup-
port-programme
background of the election campaign, confirm-
ing the regime’s repressive and isolationist na-
ture. These initiatives include the work of the 
Federation Council, underway since mid-2017, 
regarding the prevention of external interfer-
ence in Russia’s sovereignty21, the expansion of 
the law on foreign agents to include the media22, 
further limitation of unrestricted access to the 
internet and limiting freedom of speech and 
freedom of assembly (frequently under the pre-
text of combating extremism).
The fact that Putin is seeking re-election is tanta-
mount to the Kremlin’s will to solidify the pres-
ent course of its politics. Initiatives intended to 
artificially boost the attractiveness of the elector-
al ritual, alongside mock efforts to reinvigorate 
the president’s electoral programme, are merely 
attempts to shore up the legitimacy of a system 
that is devoid of any vision for the future and 
unable to generate incentives to modernisation.
21 The committee’s initial report on this matter was pub-
lished in October 2017. http://www.council.gov.ru/media/
files/f8SAIXEeNH3T8krO2G1fHZA2W2hTRuMJ.pdf
22 M. Domańska, Rosja: cios w zagraniczne media, Ana-
lizy OSW, 16 November 2017, https://www.osw.waw.
pl/pl/publikacje/analizy/2017-11-16/rosja-cios-w-zagran-
iczne-media
